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A B S T R A C T   
Across three studies (N = 607), we examined people’s use of a dichotomizing heuristic—the 
inference that characteristics belonging to one group do not apply to another group—when 
making judgments about novel social groups. Participants learned information about one group 
(e.g., “Zuttles like apples”), and then made inferences about another group (e.g., “Do Twiggums 
like apples or hate apples?”). Study 1 acted as a proof of concept: Eight-year-olds and adults (but 
not 5-year-olds) assumed that the two groups would have opposite characteristics. Learning about 
the group as a generic whole versus as specific individuals boosted the use of the heuristic. Study 
2 and Study 3 (sample sizes, methods, and analyses pre-registered), examined whether the 
presence or absence of several factors affected the activation and scope of the dichotomizing 
heuristic in adults. Whereas learning about or treating the groups as separate was necessary for 
activating dichotomous thinking, intergroup conflict and featuring only two (versus many) groups 
was not required. Moreover, the heuristic occurred when participants made both binary and 
scaled decisions. Once triggered, adults applied this cognitive shortcut widely—not only to 
benign (e.g., liking apples) and novel characteristics (e.g., liking modies), but also to evaluative 
traits signaling the morals or virtues of a social group (e.g., meanness or intelligence). Adults did 
not, however, extend the heuristic to the edges of improbability: They failed to dichotomize when 
doing so would attribute highly unusual preferences (e.g., disliking having fun). Taken together, 
these studies indicate the presence of a dichotomizing heuristic with broad implications for how 
people make social group inferences.   
1. Introduction 
People often expect social groups to differ—for example, they believe that members from one group will hold values, beliefs, 
preferences, skills, and traits that are distinct from members of another group. Such inferences about between-group differences, 
whether accurate or not, have been shaped over time through systemic influences like social hierarchies, stereotypes, and prejudice, as 
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well as by directly experienced or observed social interactions and information from others (Richter et al., 2016; Schwarz & Bless, 
2007; Tajfel, 1982). In the current study, we examined the inferences individuals make when first learning about a novel social group. 
In the absence of complex historical and phenomenological evidence, will people assume that different social groups hold opposite 
characteristics? 
Across several domains, people often use heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, to make judgments because they are quicker than more 
thorough, careful, and deliberate thinking (Kahneman, 2011; Sherman & Corty, 1984; Sunstein, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Heuristics play a vital role in reducing uncertainty, decreasing cognitive load, and increasing processing efficiency. They can, however, 
also lead to biased assumptions about social groups (e.g., when forming an impression of a new person from a known social group, 
people often use stereotypes of that social group as an anchor; when making adjustments away from this anchor they do not go far 
enough; FeldmanHall & Shenhav, 2019). Here, we investigate whether people apply a dichotomizing heuristic—what is true of one 
group is not true of another group—when forming impressions of novel social groups for which they have limited information.1 To test 
this potential heuristic, participants learned about the preferences, abilities, and traits of one group (characterized group). Participants 
then made inferences about an uncharacterized group’s preferences, abilities, and traits (no information provided). Across three studies, 
we examined what triggers the dichotomizing heuristic as well as its scope. 
Humans assume that individuals who are members of the same group share common features (Gelman, 2003). By three to four 
years of age, children use category labels to make inferences about the biological and psychological properties of individuals; for 
example, they infer that two creatures called “fish” will both breathe under water or that two kids categorized as “shy” will both like 
the same game (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Heyman & Gelman, 2000a, 2000b). Adults also give particular weight to category labels as 
compared with other features that may signal group membership when drawing inferences (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000). Moreover, 
preschoolers, school-aged children, and adults tend to extend information learned about the characteristics of one category member to 
all category members. For example, they predict that individuals from the same social group (e.g., gender or race) will share similar 
traits, preferences, beliefs, and behaviors (Diesendruck et al., 2015; Kalish, 2012; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Lagattuta & Kramer, 2021; 
McGarty & Penny, 1988; McGarty & Turner, 1992; Shutts et al., 2013), with adults overestimating stereotypic traits among group 
members (e.g., all women are caring; Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Thus, when individuals are members of the 
same category or group, people across a wide age range assume homogeneity: They infer that learning about the characteristics of one 
member provides valuable evidence about all members and that category labels can be informative about group characteristics. 
Categories, however, not only prime beliefs about within-group cohesiveness, but can also exaggerate perceptions of between- 
group differences, sometimes called category accentuation (Eiser, 1971; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). For example, 4-year-olds who first 
sorted faces into two separate categories (mean vs. nice) versus on a scaled continuum (very mean to very nice) more often assumed 
greater differences in behaviors, preferences, and intentions of meaner versus nicer looking individuals (Master et al., 2012). More-
over, adults evaluate a group with neutral traits more favorably when they simultaneously learn about another group with negative 
traits compared to when they simultaneously learn about another group with positive traits (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990). Intriguingly, 
the presence of real-world group differences is not necessary for people to assume dissimilarities; there can be illusory correlations 
(Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). For example, children and adults tend to associate majority groups with more frequent behaviors (e.g., 
positive behaviors) and minority groups with less frequent behaviors (e.g., negative behaviors), even when the proportions of these 
actions are equivalent across groups (Johnston & Jacobs, 2003; Lawson & Bower, 2014; Sherman et al., 2009). Thus, when humans 
learn about multiple categories or groups, they tend to attribute greater between-group differences than warranted by observable or 
verifiable evidence. 
Here, we extend inquiry into people’s beliefs about social groups as categories. As reviewed, the typical paradigm has involved (1) 
telling participants characteristics of one group member and seeing if they extend those characteristics to all group members, or (2) 
providing information about two separate groups and testing if participants inflate between-group differences. But, what happens if 
participants only learn the characteristics of one group—what assumptions do they make about members of a separate, uncharac-
terized group? In this uncertain context where no details are provided about the uncharacterized group, do people default to a 
dichotomizing heuristic—assume that what is true of one group must not be true of the other group? That is, with no descriptions of the 
uncharacterized group to draw from, will people judge that the two groups have opposite characteristics (evidence of a dichotomizing 
heuristic), assume the two groups share the same characteristics, or just guess randomly? 
Study 1 served as a proof of concept: Our goal was to document whether people assume that they have acquired information about 
two groups—a characterized group and an uncharacterized group—when they have only learned about one. In this initial study, we 
further tested whether the language used to discuss the characterized group influences application of the dichotomizing heuristic. That 
is, we assessed whether use of the dichotomizing heuristic is more pronounced when information about the social category is presented 
generically (i.e., describing the characterized group as a whole; e.g., “Zuttles like pears”) rather than specifically (i.e., describing 
individuals within a group; e.g., “This Zuttle, X, likes pears”). Generic language encourages children and adults to assume greater 
homogeneity within categories (Chambers et al., 2008; Gelman et al., 2002) and to create stricter boundaries between categories 
(Gelman et al., 2010; Goldfarb et al., 2017). Thus, we tested whether participants who learn about the characterized group as a generic 
whole (versus as specific individuals) more often exhibit the dichotomizing heuristic (assume that the uncharacterized group possesses 
opposite traits). 
A further goal of Study 1 was to identify age-related differences in the application of the dichotomizing heuristic. Extant research 
1 In labeling this a heuristic, we are not arguing that this inference is de facto irrational or rational, only that it is a rule-of-thumb approach that 
enables decisions under uncertainty with minimal mental effort. 
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suggests that this cognitive shortcut, if present, would develop with age as individuals continue to explore and form models of the 
social world. Preschoolers, compared to older children and adults, require more generic input before they generalize group features 
across all category members (Cimpian & Scott, 2012), and they form less rigid category boundaries between separate social groups 
(Shutts, 2015). Reliance on heuristics also strengthens not only from early to middle childhood but continues to increase from 
childhood to adulthood (Jacobs & Potenza, 1991; Lagattuta & Kramer, 2021; Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2013; Lagattuta et al., 2018; Reyna & 
Ellis, 1994). Based on this combined evidence, we reasoned that young children would less often use a dichotomizing heuristic to make 
inferences about an uncharacterized group. Therefore, we tested whether older participants would more often endorse inter-group 
dichotomies than younger children. 
Recent evidence to support this new research direction in social group reasoning comes from Moty and Rhodes (2021).2 Children as 
young as 4.5 years, and increasing with age (i.e., between 4.5 and 7 years and between 7 and adulthood), judged that characteristics of 
one group (e.g., skill at baking) do not apply to a different social group. Moreover, learning about groups in generic (e.g., Zarpies are 
good at baking pizza) versus specific language (e.g., This Zarpie is good at baking pizza) magnified this effect. In these studies, 
however, the experimenter explicitly told participants that the two groups—Zarpies and Gorps—were “two kinds of people” and they 
pictured them wearing distinctive clothes (e.g., all green for Zarpies; all yellow for Gorps). Starting from the salient premise that the 
two groups had different origins and different clothing preferences could have biased participants to expect dissimilarity across all 
characteristics, facilitating dichotomizing at an early age. 
In Studies 1 and 2, we provided a more stringent test by examining whether participants also exhibit the dichotomizing heuristic 
when the two social groups share a common biological and social origin (e.g., similar to how non-indigenous American colonists 
separated from the British) and cannot be distinguished visually; thus, making it equivalently plausible to assume either between- 
group similarities or differences. In Study 2, we also manipulated exposure to a categorization (sorting) task to test whether 
thinking about the groups as separate entities activates the dichotomizing heuristic. In that study, we further investigated whether 
intergroup conflict or beneficence shaped the dichotomizing heuristic. In Study 3, we removed the shared biological and social origin 
of Zuttles and Twiggums, but we provided no distinguishing information beyond the different category labels. In this study, we again 
tested whether experience separating individuals into different groups (the categorization task) is necessary for activating the heuristic 
if groups were initially described as distinct. In addition, we measured whether the dichotomizing heuristic was bolstered by learning 
about the uncharacterized group in the presence of only one other group (i.e., setting up a binary contrast) versus in the presence of 
many groups (i.e., no clear contrast between one group and another). We also changed our dependent variable from binary to scaled to 
test the robustness of the effect. Moreover, we assessed the scope and potential limits of the dichotomizing heuristic by analyzing 
whether participants apply it to benign (e.g., liking apples), novel (e.g., like modies), evaluative (e.g., being smart), and universal 
characteristics (e.g., disliking getting hurt). 
2. Study 1 
Study 1 builds upon the novel-group paradigm utilized by Goldfarb et al. (2017; for further examples of novel-group methods, see 
Killen, 2007; Roberts et al., 2018). In Goldfarb et al. (2017), 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults learned about a fictitious social group 
of human-like creatures, Twiggums, who lived in a valley. Some Twiggums left the valley to live in the mountains. There, they formed a 
new group and renamed themselves Zuttles, a social group whose members still looked indistinguishable from Twiggums. Next, 
participants learned about Zuttle preferences and abilities either in generic language (e.g., “Zuttles like pears”) or in specific language 
(e.g., “This Zuttle, Dax, likes pears”). Participants then completed a social categorization task where they saw a creature paired with 
three characteristics. Children and adults decided whether that individual was a Zuttle or a Twiggum by making characteristic-to- 
category judgments. They received no feedback about the correctness of their choice because there was no objective truth given 
that participants had no information about Twiggums. 
In one version of the social categorization task (neutral stance), participants sorted creatures without consequence: Nothing 
happened to those identified as Zuttles. In the other condition (negative stance), a law banned creatures identified as Zuttles from the 
valley, forced them to be jailed for 100 days, and then required their deportation. While Goldfarb et al. (2017) presented the findings 
from the categorization task, Study 1 of the current manuscript focuses on a separate measure that participants completed after the 
social categorization task. This new uncharacterized group task asked children and adults to judge whether they thought Twiggums 
(uncharacterized group) differed from or aligned with Zuttles (characterized group) in their preferences and abilities; that is, they 
made category-to-characteristic judgments. Of central interest was whether participants would use a dichotomizing heuristic—what is 
true of one group is not true of the other group—when making inferences about the uncharacterized group. Our paradigm differed 
from Moty and Rhodes (2021) in that we neither described Zuttles and Twiggums as “two kinds of people” nor showed them as 
differing in appearance. Rather, to lessen the demand to assume group differences, Zuttles and Twiggums (1) had a common biological 
and social origin; and (2) looked identical. In addition to these shared features, we also included factors which could suggest that the 
groups might differ, including elective migration and punitive laws: (1) some Twiggums decided to move to the mountains and call 
themselves Zuttles; and (2) the Twiggums then made a law banning Zuttles from the valley. 
2 For transparency, although we include Moty and Rhodes (2021) in the Introduction, the methods and hypotheses for the studies reported here 
were not created to extend that study. We completed all analyses for Study 1 prior to Moty and Rhodes’ preregistration. Pilot Study 2 and Study 2 
were preregistered and completed prior to Moty and Rhodes (2021) being accepted for publication. Moty and Rhodes (2021) also do not use the 
term “dichotomizing heuristic” when discussing their findings. 
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Participants included 181 children and adults divided into three age groups: 66 5-year-olds (M = 5.57 years, SD = 0.76 years, range 
= 4.20 years to 6.99 years; 34 male, 32 female), 62 8-year-olds (M = 8.40 years, SD = 0.84 years, range = 7.06 years to 10.48 years; 29 
male, 33 female), and 53 adults (M = 22.61 years, SD = 7.47 years, range = 18.17 years to 60.15 years; 24 male, 29 female). The 
sample was 14% Asian, 2% Black or African American, 10% Hispanic/Latino, 58% White, and 16% “Other” race or ethnicity.3 Included 
participants were fluent in comprehending and speaking English and were typically developing (parent-reported for child participants, 
self-reported for adults). Children were recruited from a list of previous participants, referral, recruitment at local farmers’ markets and 
schools, listserv emails, and fliers. Adults were recruited from an undergraduate psychology database. Data were collected from 
October 2013 to October 2014. Participants were the same as those included in Goldfarb et al. (2017) minus nine adults who did not 
complete the uncharacterized group task. This study was approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of California, Davis: 
Protocol Number: 448441. 
2.1.2. Measures and procedures 
This study followed a 3 (age: 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, adults) × 2 (language: generic, specific) design. Age and language were 
between-subjects factors. 
Narrative and Social Categorization Task. Participants learned from a pre-recorded video (i.e., pictures on a computer screen 
accompanied by audio) that a group of human-like creatures, Twiggums, lived in a valley. Some of the Twiggums left the valley to live 
in the mountains. Once there, this group of Twiggums re-named themselves Zuttles. Participants then learned about Zuttles’ prefer-
ences and abilities in either generic (e.g., “Zuttles like pears.”) or specific language (e.g., “This Zuttle, Dax, likes pears.”). All featured 
Zuttle characteristics were benign (i.e., did not indicate any deviance or threat of harm) and non-distinctive (i.e., could be widely 
shared, even with the participants themselves). 
Next, participants completed the social categorization task that required them to determine whether a series of creatures were 
Zuttles (characterized group) or Twiggums (uncharacterized group) based on three pieces of information about their characteristics 
(only a subset matched what they learned about Zuttles). In the negative stance context, participants were told that the Twiggums had 
created a law forbidding Zuttles from living in the valley. Thus, those identified as Zuttles would be sent to jail for 100 days and then 
deported. In the neutral stance context, there were no consequences for creatures identified as Zuttles. Context order was counter-
balanced. To control for differences in responding due to variation in working memory skills, all participants were given a memory-cue 
card that displayed the characteristics they had learned about Zuttles. Following research with young children (e.g., Lagattuta, 2008; 
Lara et al., 2019), we used crossed-out images to signify that a Zuttle/Zuttles hates something or is/are bad at something. For more 
details on the social categorization task, see Goldfarb et al. (2017). 
Uncharacterized Group Task. After the social categorization task, children and adults predicted Twiggums’ (uncharacterized 
group) preferences and abilities. We introduced the task as, “While we talked a lot about Zuttles, I am going to ask you some questions 
about what you think Twiggums might be like. Just make your best guess. There is no right answer. This is based on what you think.” 
We then asked participants about eight of the characteristics (e.g., “Do you think Twiggums like pears or hate pears?”). The memory- 
cue sheet remained visible throughout. 
We coded each response as dichotomized (1; participant said that Twiggums had the opposite preference or ability from Zuttles) or 
aligned (0; participant said that Twiggums had the same preference or ability as Zuttles). The eight characteristics showed good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.84, 0.90]; 5-year-olds: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80, 95% CI [0.73, 
0.87]; 8-year-olds: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89, 95% CI [0.85, 0.93]; adults: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90, 95% CI [0.86, 0.94]). We 
calculated the proportion of trials that participants dichotomized Twiggums and Zuttles for analyses (see Table S1 for individual trial 
level data). Higher scores reflect a greater frequency of inferring that the uncharacterized group had opposite traits to the charac-
terized group. We removed one 8-year-old from analyses because she both dichotomized and aligned the groups on every trial (e.g., 
stating that the uncharacterized group both liked pears and hated pears). Although this is a potentially logical response, we excluded 
her because we could not represent her decisions within our coding scheme. One 5-year-old also followed this pattern for only one 
characteristic (i.e., stating that the uncharacterized group was both good and bad at playing drums) so we calculated his proportion 
score out of seven rather than eight trials (N = 180). 
General Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room as part of a larger study on social reasoning.4 Participants 
completed the social categorization task (as reported in Goldfarb et al., 2017) prior to the uncharacterized group task. Children 
received $10.00 and adults were given course credit for the approximately one-hour session. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
We conducted analyses in RStudio (R Version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2017). We tested the effects of generic language and age on the 
proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the two groups (Table 1, Figs. 1 and 2). Language and age were between-subjects 
3 Race and ethnicity data were missing from one 8-year-old participant.  
4 Participants also responded to questions aimed at addressing their essentialist beliefs, working memory, and fairness and procedural justice 
judgments. These measures will be analyzed in separate manuscripts. 
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factors. A 2 (language: specific, generic) × 3 (age: 5-, 8-year-olds, adults) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) resulted in main 
effects for language, F(1, 174) = 7.65, p = .006, ηp2 = .04, and age, F(2, 174) = 8.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. The Language × Age interaction 
was not significant, F(2, 174) = 1.34, p = .265, ηp2 = .02. 
As anticipated, participants in the generic-language condition dichotomized Zuttles and Twiggums more frequently than those in 
the specific-language condition (p = .006). Still, participants in both language conditions judged the two groups to have opposite 
preferences and skills more often than would be expected by chance (0.50; generic: t[82] = 6.66, p < .001, d = 0.73; specific: t[96] =
3.70, p < .001, d = 0.38). Consistent with our predictions, Tukey’s HSD comparisons showed that adults dichotomized the groups more 
frequently than did 5-year-olds (p < .001). Eight-year-olds did not differ from either 5-year-olds (p = .065) or adults (p = .111). 
Whereas adults (t[52] = 7.18, p < .001, d = 0.99) and 8-year-olds (t[60] = 4.43, p < .001, d = 0.57) dichotomized the two groups more 
frequently than would be expected by chance, 5-year-olds responded at chance (t[65] = 1.69, p = .096, d = 0.21). 
Our results indicate that by eight years of age, individuals exhibit a dichotomizing heuristic when forming impressions of new 
social groups. Older children and adults used what they knew about one group to infer that the opposite was true of the other group. 
Although participants made this inference in both language conditions, learning about the characterized group as a whole (generically 
versus as specific individuals) boosted the frequency that participants expected dichotomies between social groups. These findings are 
consistent with Moty and Rhodes (2021) in that generic language magnified children’s and adults’ expectation of social dichotomies, 
and older children and adults assume dichotomies more than younger children. Still, it is notable that although the dichotomizing 
heuristic was strong at the level of the individual (e.g., 81% of 8-year-olds in the generic language condition dichotomized the groups 
on > 50% of trials), a minority of participants consistently assumed that the two groups would have identical preferences and abilities 
(see Table S1). This provides assurance that aligning the groups is also possible within our paradigm. 
3. Study 2 
Study 1 confirmed the presence of the dichotomizing heuristic, but questions remain as to the circumstances under which it 
emerges. Prior research has demonstrated that group divisions must serve a functional purpose before people will use these categories 
in meaningful ways (Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al., 1997). Perhaps our social categorization task, which preceded the uncharacterized 
group task, acted as a catalyst for the heuristic because it encouraged participants to imagine that Twiggums and Zuttles were “two 
different kinds”—the explicit starting premise in Moty and Rhodes (2021). In a pilot study for Study 2 (see Online Supplementary 
Information), we found preliminary evidence that removing the categorization task reduced the dichotomizing heuristic. As a more 
rigorous test in Study 2, we manipulated (between subjects) whether participants did or did not complete the social categorization task 
prior to making inferences about the uncharacterized group. This enabled us to test whether repetition separating individuals into two 
social groups by making characteristic-to-group inferences (i.e., deciding whether each individual is a Zuttle or a Twiggum based on 
varying evidence about their preferences and abilities) activates the dichotomizing heuristic. 
In Study 1, all participants learned that Twiggums criminalized Zuttles living in the Twiggum Valley (if found, Zuttles would be 
jailed for 100 days and deported). This evidence of between-group conflict may have boosted the use of the dichotomizing heuristic. 
Enforced physical and legal boundaries could have signaled to participants that there were perceived incompatibilities between Zuttles 
and Twiggums. Indeed, intergroup conflict can magnify negative views of outgroup members as well as beliefs about differences 
(Allport, 1954; Dovidio et al., 2005; Esses et al., 2005). In Study 2, we tested whether intergroup conflict affected adults’ tendency to 
use the dichotomizing heuristic. We manipulated (between subjects) whether the two groups held a negative or positive stance towards 
each other. 
Study 1 focused on categorizing human-like, imaginary creatures. Although this fictional context is a common method in novel 
group paradigms (see Killen, 2007; Roberts et al., 2017), we sought to test whether participants would apply the dichotomizing 
heuristic to human social groups. Thus, Study 2 involved novel human groups. As in Study 1, we explicitly stated that the two groups 
shared the same biological and social origin. 
Finally, we examined the scope of the dichotomizing heuristic. Participants in Study 1 may have interpreted the uncharacterized 
group task as assessing what they “learned” in the social categorization task. If so, then their willingness to expect dichotomies should 
be confined only to qualities that were featured during the social categorization task. Perhaps, however, the dichotomizing heuristic 
has even greater reach. In Study 2, we measured whether adults would apply this inference to novel preferences and skills (e.g., if told 
that Zuttles like “modies” do they infer that Twiggums hate “modies?”). We also examined whether they would even use this heuristic 
when reasoning about evaluative traits (e.g., if told that Zuttles are “smart” do they infer that Twiggums are “not smart?”). Indeed, the 
potential real-world negative consequences of the dichotomizing heuristic would be especially severe if people use it when inferring 
evaluative traits that signal morals or virtues of an uncharacterized group. 
Given these multiple changes needed to systematically unpack the conditions that give rise to the dichotomizing heuristic as well as 
its potential scope and boundaries, we shifted to an exclusive focus on adults for Studies 2 and 3. We return to the necessity of 
Table 1 
Study 1: Means (SDs) of Proportion of Trials Dichotomized by Age Group and Language Condition.   
5-year-olds 8-year-olds Adults Across Age 
Specific Language 0.55 (0.29) 0.60 (0.34) 0.73 (0.36) 0.63 (0.33) 
Generic Language 0.58 (0.36) 0.79 (0.33) 0.90 (0.15) 0.74 (0.33) 
Across Language 0.57 (0.32) 0.70 (0.35) 0.80 (0.30) 0.68 (0.34)  
H.J. Kramer et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cognitive Psychology 129 (2021) 101408
6
understanding the developmental trajectory of the dichotomizing heuristic in the General Discussion. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 214 undergraduate students (M = 21.13 years, SD = 2.43 years, 105, males, 109 females). Included participants 
were fluent in comprehending and speaking English and were typically developing (via self-report). The sample was 55% Asian, 2% 
Black or African American, 17% Hispanic/Latino, 14% White, 8% Multiracial or Multiethnic, and 4% other races or ethnicities. We set 
the sample size for each cell at 53 participants per cell (N = 212) based on Simonsohn’s (2015) recommendation of multiplying the 
original sample (n = 21 adults in the generic language condition of Study 1) by 2.5. This sample size (53 participants per condition) 
gave us > 99% power to detect a d = 2.76 (the effect size of the dichotomizing heuristic in the adults in the generic language condition 
in Study 1) for a one-sample t-test (the key test of whether participants in each condition exhibit the dichotomizing heuristic); for the 
same analysis, it also gives us 80% power to detect a d > 0.39. We stopped data collection the day this goal was met. We included three 
attention checks that appeared randomly during the dichotomizing phases of the study ([1] Please select the number 4; options: 4, 8; 
[2] Please select the number 3; options: 1, 3; [3] Please select the number 7; options: 7, 4). We excluded four participants who were not 
100% accurate. The final sample included 210 participants. Participants received course credit. Data were collected from June 2019 
through October 2019. This study was approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of California, Davis: Protocol Number: 
1031991. The sample size (including exclusions), method, and planned analyses were pre-registered on Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/nw5jx/?view_only=811245f5693a4b3f8f3112b5a7dec7d3). 
3.1.2. Measures and Procedure 
This study followed a 2 (categorization: categorization, no-categorization) × 2 (stance: negative, positive) × 3 (type: initial, novel, 
evaluative) design. Categorization was a between-subjects factor that differed in whether participants did (categorization) or did not 
(no-categorization) complete a social categorization task before the dichotomizing measure. Stance was a between-subjects factor that 
differed in whether there was conflict (negative) or goodwill (positive) between the two groups. Type was a within-subjects factor 
where participants responded to three phases of the dichotomizing measure (see details below). 
Fig. 1. Study 1: Proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the Zuttles (characterized group) and Twiggums (uncharacterized group) by 
language condition. Note. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line signifies chance. 
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Narrative and Social Categorization Task. All participants were tested individually in a quiet room at a university laboratory. 
After completing informed consent and basic demographic information, participants responded to a series of tasks via Qualtrics Survey 
Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Participants learned about a group of humans called Twiggums who lived on an island. They were also 
told that some Twiggums left Twiggum Island to form a new group called Zuttles who lived on Zuttle Island. Participants then learned 
about Zuttle characteristics in generic language (i.e., their preferences and abilities; e.g., Zuttles like pears; Zuttles are bad at playing 
soccer). These were the same characteristics used in Study 1. All participants were given a piece of paper (to put next to the computer) 
that listed all of the learned Zuttle characteristics (we used four different blocked orders for this memory card). 
Participants in the two categorization conditions then completed the categorization task. As with Study 1, they were told three 
qualities about each of a series of individuals, and they had to judge whether each person was a Zuttle or a Twiggum. Participants in the 
Categorization/Negative (Cat/Neg) condition were told that there was a law prohibiting Zuttles from living on Twiggum Island: They 
sorted individuals to determine who would be deported back to Zuttle Island. In contrast, participants in the Categorization/Positive 
(Cat/Pos) condition learned that there was a law allowing Zuttles to live on Twiggum Island: They sorted individuals to determine who 
would be invited to a “welcome” party. This social categorization task, including randomization by evidence type, was identical to 
Study 1 except that the information was displayed in a written format rather than using a narrated story with pictures. Participants in 
the no-categorization conditions (No-Categorization/Negative [NoCat/Neg]; No-Categorization/Positive [NoCat/Pos]) read the same 
information as those in the categorization conditions (i.e., the 12 Zuttle characteristics, the law either prohibiting or welcoming Zuttles 
to live on Twiggum Island), but they did not complete the social categorization (sorting) task. 
Uncharacterized Group Task. All participants then completed three questioning sets where they inferred the traits of the Twig-
gums. Questions followed a similar format to that of Study 1: Participants were asked to judge whether Twiggums had various 
preferences, abilities, and traits. These questioning sets followed the same fixed order for all participants. 
First, the initial set included the 12 characteristics that were featured in the Zuttle familiarization phase and appeared in the 
categorization task. Thus, this set is a close replication of the uncharacterized group judgment task used in Study 1 (e.g., “Do you think 
that Twiggums like pears or hate pears?” Answer choices: Twiggums like pears; Twiggums hate pears). Within this questioning set, 
responses showed excellent internal consistency across conditions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.98, 95% CI [0.97, 0.98]). For analyses, we 
created a proportion of initial trials dichotomized (see Table S2 and Table S5 for individual trial level data). 
Second, the novel set included 12 preferences and abilities described using novel words presented for the first time (e.g., liking 
Fig. 2. Study 1: Proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the Zuttles (characterized group) and Twiggums (uncharacterized group) by age 
group. Note. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line signifies chance. 
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“blickets”). The use of novel words ensured that participants could not rely on what they had learned during the initial Zuttle 
familiarization or had applied in the categorization task. Participants responded to four blocks of three questions (presented in random 
order; e.g., “Here are some foods that you have never heard about. Zuttles like blickets, modies, and kifs. So, what do you think about 
Twiggums? Do you think Twiggums like blickets or hate blickets?” Answer choices: Twiggums like blickets, Twiggums hate blickets). 
Within this questioning set, responses showed excellent internal consistency across conditions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.97, 95% CI [0.96, 
0.98]). For analyses, we created a proportion of novel trials dichotomized (see Table S3 and Table S5 for individual trial level data). 
Finally, in the evaluative set participants were told 12 evaluative traits about Zuttles and made inferences about Twiggums. Par-
ticipants learned about 4 positive traits (smart, creative, honest, funny), 4 equivocal traits (shy, confident, superstitious, liberal), and 4 
negative traits (mean, moody, messy, lazy). For each trait, participants were randomly assigned to learn that Zuttles either did (two of 
each valence: positive, equivocal, negative) or did not (two of each valence) possess the trait (e.g., “Zuttles are smart. So, what do you 
think about Twiggums?” Answers: Twiggums are smart; Twiggums are not smart). Traits were presented in randomized order. Within 
this questioning set, responses showed excellent internal consistency across conditions (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93, 95% CI [0.92, 
0.94]).5 For analyses, we created a proportion of evaluative trials dichotomized (see Table S4 and Table S5 for individual trial level 
data). 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
We examined whether the proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the characterized and uncharacterized groups 
differed by categorization condition (categorization vs. no categorization task), stance (negative vs. positive intergroup relations), and 
judgment type (initial vs. novel vs. evaluative traits). Analyses were conducted in RStudio (version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2019). See 
Online Supplemental Materials for relations between the social categorization task and the uncharacterized group task.6 
We ran a 2 (categorization: categorization, no categorization) × 2 (stance: negative, positive) × 3 (type: initial, novel, evaluative) 
mixed-effects ANOVA on the proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the groups. Categorization and stance were between- 
subjects factors and type was a within-subjects factor. This analysis resulted in a main effect for categorization, F(1, 206) = 195.48, p <
.001, ηp2 = .49, and type, F(2, 412) = 6.09, p = .002, ηp2 = .03, qualified by Categorization × Type, F(2, 412) = 17.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 
and Categorization × Stance × Type interactions, F(2, 412) = 3.50, p = .031, ηp2 = .02. 
As shown in Table 2 and Fig. 3, participants in the categorization conditions dichotomized the groups more often than those in the 
no-categorization conditions for each of the judgment types (initial, novel, evaluative) and regardless of intergroup stance (ps < .001). 
Although stance had no effect in the categorization conditions (Cat/Neg = Cat/Pos for initial, novel, and evaluative traits, ps > .647), 
negative intergroup relations boosted dichotomizing responses in the no-categorization conditions for the initial (NoCat/Neg >
NoCat/Pos, p = .009) and novel questioning sets (NoCat/Neg > NoCat/Pos, p = .008). Participants in the categorization conditions 
(Cat/Neg, Cat/Pos) dichotomized the two groups more frequently than would be expected by chance for all judgment types (see chance 
analyses below), but they did so more frequently for initial > novel > evaluative (ps < .045; but for Cat/Pos: initial = novel, p = .064). 
In contrast, participants in the no-categorization conditions dichotomized the groups at comparably low rates and below chance (see 
below) regardless of judgment type (ps > .230; but for NoCat/Pos: evaluative > initial, novel, ps < .018). 
Participants who completed the social categorization measure prior to the uncharacterized group task (Cat/Neg, Cat/Pos) assumed 
that the two groups had opposite traits (compared to chance [0.50]) across all judgment types (initial, novel, evaluative; Cat/Neg: t 
[51]s > 3.18, ps < .003, ds > 0.44; Cat/Pos: t[51]s > 2.90, ps < .005, ds > 0.40). In contrast, participants in the no-categorization 
conditions (NoCat/Neg, NoCat/Pos) dichotomized the groups below chance across all judgment types (NoCat/Neg: t[53]s > 3.74, 
ps < .001, ds > 0.51; NoCat/Pos: t[51]s > 7.25, ps < .001, ds > 1.01). These effects also consistently occurred at the individual level 
(see Tables S2, S3, S4). For example, whereas 85% of participants in the Cat/Neg and Cat/Pos conditions dichotomized the groups on 
more than 50% of trials, only 24% of participants in the NoCat/Neg and 10% of participants in NoCat/Pos conditions followed this 
pattern. 
Study 2 clarified the factors that lead people to use a dichotomizing heuristic when forming impressions of social groups: Adults 
only displayed this rule-of-thumb shortcut at high frequency when they perceived the two groups as separate via making 
characteristic-to-category inferences during the social categorization task. In contrast, animosity between the groups was not neces-
sary. Beyond illustrating what catalyzes this cognitive shortcut, we also documented its expansive range. That is, we discovered that 
adults not only assumed that the uncharacterized group (Twiggums) differed from the characterized group (Zuttles) when reasoning 
about the initial set of preferences and abilities that they applied during the social categorization task (e.g., whether a group likes 
pears), but also when considering novel preferences and abilities (e.g., whether a group likes modies) as well as evaluative traits (e.g., 
5 After responding to the key measures reported in this manuscript (i.e., the social categorization task and the uncharacterized group judgment 
task), participants answered some exploratory pilot questions (i.e., how similar participants viewed themselves to Zuttles; how similar participants 
viewed themselves to Twiggums; how similar participants viewed Zuttles and Twiggums; and what they thought some of the novel words meant).  
6 Although it was not a primary goal to replicate the findings from Goldfarb et al. (2017), the design of the current study afforded this opportunity. 
Conceptually replicating Goldfarb et al. (2017), participants categorized individuals at comparable rates regardless of the consequence (i.e., 
deportation vs. invitation to a “welcome” party). Also replicating Goldfarb et al. (2017), we found that participants were more likely to categorize 
individuals as Zuttles the more evidence matched what they learned about Zuttles, and adults were willing to categorize an unknown individual as a 
Zuttle at above-chance levels as long as at least one piece of evidence matched what they had learned about Zuttles. See Online Supplemental 
Material for analytic details. 
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whether a group is lazy). 
4. Study 3 
Study 2 demonstrated that repetitively attempting to sort individuals into separate social groups based on evidence about each 
individual’s characteristics was necessary for adults to show the dichotomizing heuristic when later asked to make inferences about the 
preferences and skills of an uncharacterized group. It is possible, however, that the categorization task would have carried less weight 
if participants had not been told that Zuttles and Twiggums shared an identical biological and social origin as well as looked the same. 
Thus, in Study 3, we tested whether making the social groups functionally separate from the start would be sufficient to elicit the 
dichotomizing heuristic, even in the absence of the categorization task. 
Study 3 also addressed two additional methodological limitations. In Studies 1 and 2 as well as in Moty and Rhodes (2021), the 
narratives highlighted binary contrasts: There were two groups (i.e., Zuttles vs. Twiggums) and participants made binary choices (e.g., 
They judged whether Twiggums were either good or bad at basketball). Perhaps these binary cues augmented the dichotomizing 
heuristic. Designing the prior studies in these ways was sensible because we were interested in capturing what participants assumed 
Table 2 
Study 2: Means (SDs) of Proportion of Trials Dichotomized.   
Categorization- Negative 
(n = 52) 
Categorization- Positive 
(n = 52) 
No-Categorization-Negative 
(n = 54) 
No-Categorization- Positive 
(n = 52) 
All Conditions 
Initial 0.83 (0.29) 0.85 (0.31) 0.28 (0.39) 0.11 (0.22) 0.51 (0.45) 
Novel 0.74 (0.36) 0.77 (0.34) 0.30 (0.38) 0.14 (0.23) 0.49 (0.43) 
Evaluative 0.66 (0.35) 0.64 (0.35) 0.26 (0.30) 0.23 (0.26) 0.44 (0.37) 
All 0.74 (0.29) 0.75 (0.28) 0.28 (0.32) 0.16 (0.18) 0.48 (0.38)  
Fig. 3. Study 2: Proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the Zuttles (characterized group) and Twiggums (uncharacterized group) by type 
(Initial, Novel, Evaluative), categorization (categorization, no-categorization), and stance conditions (positive, negative). Note. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. Dashed line signifies chance. Cat/Neg = Categorization/Negative; Cat/Pos = Categorization/Positive; NoCat/Neg = No- 
Categorization/Negative; NoCat/Pos = No-Categorization/Positive. 
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about two groups when forced to choose. From a methodological and theoretical perspective, however, it is important to examine how 
these factors influence the dichotomizing heuristic. In Study 3, therefore, we allowed participants to make scaled (as opposed to bi-
nary) judgments, and we manipulated between subjects whether participants learned that there were many groups versus only two 
groups who lived in the region. 
Because we found that participants in Study 2 were willing to dichotomize groups even when reasoning about evaluative traits (e. 
g., whether a social group was smart or lazy), we tested a new potential boundary condition. That is, in Study 3 we measured adults’ 
use of the dichotomizing heuristic when the characterized group (Zuttles) had preferences that one would expect most humans to have 
(e.g., Zuttles dislike getting sick; Zuttles like feeling happy). We will refer to these characteristics as universal. Here, to infer that the 
uncharacterized group (Twiggums) had opposite characteristics would require participants to judge that this group held extremely 
atypical preferences (e.g., they like getting sick; they dislike feeling happy). 
We also investigated a possible outcome related to the dichotomizing heuristic. In particular, we were curious about whether the 
tendency to dichotomize is related to beliefs about broader intergroup relations. To do this, we explored whether individuals who 
assumed greater differences between Zuttles and Twiggums also expected that the two groups lived more segregated (versus inte-
grated) lives in their social communities. We included questions about whether Zuttles and Twiggums lived in the same neighbor-
hoods, went to the same schools, were friends, were romantically involved with each other, and went to the same doctors. Assessing 
beliefs about the Twiggum/Zuttle society is also of interest because it speaks to the contexts under which people might utilize the 
dichotomizing heuristic. For example, do adults only apply the dichotomizing heuristic when they assume that the groups live separate 
lives or do they still make this cognitive shortcut even when they think that a society is well integrated? 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 212 undergraduate students (M = 20.20 years, SD = 2.25 years, 43 males, 162 females, 1 gender non-binary).7 
Included participants were fluent in comprehending and speaking English and were typically developing (via self-report). The sample 
was 39% East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese), 1% Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 11% South Asian (e.g., Indian, 
Pakistani), 12% South East Asian (e.g., Thai, Vietnamese, Filipino), 8% White, and 10% another race or ethnicity or multiracial.8 We 
set the sample size at 53 participants per cell (N = 212) to remain consistent with Study 2. In addition, 53 participants per condition 
gives us 82% power to detect a d = 0.40 or greater (the smallest effect detected in Study 2) for a one-sample t-test. We stopped data 
collection the day this goal was met. We included five attention checks throughout the study (e.g., Please select the number 3; options: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5). We excluded 6 participants who missed two or more of these checks. The final sample included 206 participants. Par-
ticipants received course credit. 
Data were collected in February 2021. This study was approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of California, Davis: 
Protocol Number: 1031991. The sample size (including exclusions), method, and planned analyses were pre-registered on the Open 
Science Framework (https://osf.io/73gdh/?view_only=0889aaedfd3b4da6a414f3440d937116). 
4.1.2. Measures and Procedure 
This study followed a 2 (size: two, many) × 2 (categorization: categorization, no-categorization) × 4 (type: initial, novel, evalu-
ative, universal) design. Size was a between-subjects factors that varied in whether participants learned that two groups lived on the 
island (Two) or whether many groups lived on the island (Many). Categorization was a between-subjects factor that differed in whether 
participants did (Cat) or did not (NoCat) complete a social categorization task before the dichotomizing measure. Type was a within- 
subject factor where participants engaged in four phases of the dichotomizing task which each inquired about different types of 
characteristics (initial, novel, evaluative, and universal). 
Narrative and Social Categorization Task. All participants were tested online via Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, 
UT) due to the restrictions on in-person testing caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. After completing informed consent and basic de-
mographic information, participants responded to the main tasks. All participants learned about an island where groups of humans 
lived. Half of the participants learned that two groups of humans lived on the island (Two-Group Condition: “Imagine that there are 
two groups of humans who live on an island. One of the groups is called Zuttles. The other group is called Twiggums”). In the other 
condition, participants learned that many groups of humans lived on the island (Many-Group Condition: “Imagine that there are many 
groups of humans who live on an island. One of the groups is called Zuttles.”). We included a comprehension check (“So, how many 
groups of humans live on the island?” Choices: 1, 2, many). Participants were not able to move on until they answered this question 
correctly. In both conditions, we avoided using any “difference” language so as to not cue that the groups differed beyond having 
separate category labels. 
Next, all participants learned about the 12 Zuttle characteristics (i.e., their preferences and abilities as in Studies 1 and 2; e.g., 
Zuttles like pears). Half of the participants then completed the categorization task. In the two-group version (Two-Group/Categori-
zation [Two/Cat]), the categorization task was the same as Study 2. For participants in the many-groups version (Many-Group/ 
7 Three additional participants consented to the study but did not complete it (i.e., they were never assigned to a condition). One of these 
participants provided some basic demographic information, but did not respond to any of the other variables. The other two participants, consented 
but then responded to no additional variables.  
8 Between Study 2 and Study 3 we updated our basic demographics to be more specific. 
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Categorization [Many/Cat]), the only difference was that participants were asked to determine whether each individual was a Zuttle or 
“someone from another group.” Participants in the no-categorization condition did not complete the categorization task (Two-Group/ 
No-Categorization [Two/NoCat]; Many-Group/No-Categorization [Many/NoCat]). 
Uncharacterized Group Task. All participants then completed four questioning sets where they made inferences about the 
preferences, skills, and traits of the uncharacterized group, the Twiggums. Participants in the Two Group Condition (Two/Cat, Two/ 
NoCat) were introduced to the task in the same way as participants in Study 2. Participants in the Many Group Condition (Many/Cat, 
Many/NoCat) were told that they would be answering questions about one of the other groups, Twiggums. These were similar 
questions to Study 2 except that participants made judgments about Twiggums’ preferences, abilities, and traits using a 5-point scale 
rather than making a binary choice. These questioning sets followed the same fixed order for all participants. 
First, participants responded to the initial set of the 12 characteristics that were included in the Zuttle familiarization narrative (all 
conditions) and also appeared in the categorization task (Two/Cat, Many/Cat). On each trial, participants were reminded of the 
Zuttles’ characteristic, and then they made a judgment about Twiggums (e.g., “Remember…Zuttles like pears. So, what do you think 
about Twiggums?”, 5-point scale: ranging from Twiggums DISLIKE pears to Twiggums LIKE pears, midpoint = Twiggums are 
NEUTRAL in this preference). 
Second, participants responded to the novel set of 12 preferences and abilities described using novel words (e.g., being good at 
playing daxes). Participants responded to four blocks of three questions (presented in random order; e.g., “Here are some activities that 
you have never heard about. Zuttles are good at playing lups, daxes, and nafs. So, what do you think about Twiggums?”, 5-point scale: 
Twiggums are BAD at playing lups to Twiggums are GOOD at playing lups, midpoint = Twiggums are NEUTRAL in this skill). 
Third, in the evaluative set participants were told 12 evaluative traits about Zuttles and made inferences about Twiggums. Par-
ticipants learned about 4 positive traits (smart, creative, honest, funny), 4 equivocal traits (shy, confident, superstitious, liberal), and 4 
negative traits (mean, moody, messy, lazy). For each trait, participants were randomly assigned to learn that Zuttles either did (two of 
each valence: positive, equivocal, negative) or did not (two of each valence) possess the trait (e.g., “Zuttles are smart. So, what do you 
think about Twiggums?”, 5-point scale: Twiggums ARE NOT smart to Twiggums ARE smart, midpoint = Twiggums are NEUTRAL in 
this trait). Traits were presented in randomized order. 
Fourth, in the universal set participants responded to 12 preference trials that involved Zuttles holding universal attitudes (e.g., 
Zuttles dislike getting sick). Participants learned that Zuttles had 6 universal dislikes (e.g., Zuttles dislike the sound of nails on a 
chalkboard) and 6 universal likes (e.g., Zuttles like having fun). Participants then made judgments about Twiggums on a 5-point scale 
(e.g., “So, what do you think about Twiggums?”, 5-point scale: Twiggums DISLIKE getting sick to Twiggums LIKE getting sick, 
midpoint = Twiggums are NEUTRAL in this preference). These items were presented in a random order. 
We used a 5-point scale for several reasons. It mirrored prior studies in that participants had to make a judgment about Twiggums’ 
characteristics. It also allowed us keep the same training (i.e., the items that Zuttles liked/disliked and were good/bad at),9 limiting the 
number of changes we made from prior studies (maximizing what we could learn in this study). Participants could pick the scale 
midpoint instead of being forced to pick one side of the scale creating a more stringent test of the dichotomizing heuristic. We labeled 
the midpoint “neutral in this preference/skill/trait” to limit ambiguity about the scale values. Moreover, dichotomizing the groups on 
this scale required participants to switch sides of the scale depending on the trial. That is, for half of the trials, dichotomizing required 
participants to pick a “1” or a “2” on the scale whereas for the other half of trials, dichotomizing would lead participants to pick a “4” or 
a “5.” 
Coding and scoring. For all questioning sets, the items were rescored so that higher scores indicated a greater difference between the 
characteristics of Zuttles and the characteristics of Twiggums. For all questioning sets, responses showed excellent internal consistency 
(initial: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91, 95% CI [0.89, 0.93]; novel: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95, 95% CI [0.93, 0.96]; evaluative: Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.91, 95% CI [0.89, 0.93]; universal: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94, 95% CI [0.93, 0.95]). We also rescored the judgments to 
approximate a dichotomous choice. That is, participants received a score of 1 for every trial that they chose a 4 or 5 (i.e., chose the 
opposite side of the scale for Twiggums from what they were told about Zuttles) and a score of 0 for every trial that they chose a 1, 2, or 
3 on the scale (i.e., chose the same side of the scale for Twiggums as they were told about Zuttles or chose the neutral). See Tables S5, 
S6, S7, and S8, individual level trial data. Including the neutral scale point as a failure to dichotomize provides a more conservative test 
of the dichotomizing heuristic in that we required participants to actually endorse that the uncharacterized group (Twiggums) held 
opposite characteristics. 
Proximity Task. At the end of the study, participants responded to questions examining their perceptions of the island where 
Zuttles and Twiggums live. We were interested in whether participants believed that Zuttles and Twiggums lived segregated or in-
tegrated lives on the island. Participants responded to a series of questions that required a binary response: (1) When you picture the 
island where Zuttles and Twiggums live, Zuttles likely… (a) Only live in neighborhoods with Zuttles or (b) Live in neighborhoods with 
both Zuttles and Twiggums; (2) When you picture the island where Zuttles and Twiggums live, Zuttle children likely… (a) Only go to 
school with Zuttles or (b) Go to school with both Zuttles and Twiggums; (3) When you picture the island where Zuttles and Twiggums 
live, Zuttles are likely… (a) Only friends with Zuttles or (b) Friends with both Zuttles and Twiggums; (4) When you picture the island 
where Zuttles and Twiggums live, Zuttles are likely… (a) Only romantically involved with Zuttles or (b) Romantically involved with 
Zuttles or Twiggums; (5) When you picture the island where Zuttles live, Zuttles likely… (a) Only go to doctors and hospitals used by 
Zuttles or (b) Go to doctors and hospitals used by both Zuttles and Twiggums. Participants viewed questions in a random order 
9 The only exception to this was that in the current study participants learned that Zuttles either liked or disliked certain foods rather than 
learning that they either liked or hated certain foods. 
H.J. Kramer et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cognitive Psychology 129 (2021) 101408
12
(response options were also randomized). These items showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85, 95% CI [0.82, 
0.88]). For analyses, we created a score of the proportion of trials that participants judged that the two groups lived segregated lives. 
4.2. Results and discussion 
Results are divided into two sections. First, we assessed participants’ responses to the uncharacterized group task, both their scaled 
ratings and their rescored responses that approximated a dichotomous choice. Second, we explored the data from the proximity task. 
Analyses were conducted in RStudio (version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2019). See Online Supplemental Materials for analyses on the social 
categorization task alone. 
4.2.1. Uncharacterized group task 
We ran a 2 (size: two groups, many groups) × 2 (categorization: categorization, no categorization) × 4 (type: initial, novel, 
evaluative, universal) mixed-effects ANOVA on the 5-point ratings (the higher the score the greater the difference between Twiggums 
and Zuttles). Size and categorization were between-subjects’ factors and type was a within-subjects’ factor. This analysis resulted in a 
main effect for categorization, F(1, 202) = 14.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, and type, F(3, 606) = 121.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .38 (see Table 3). 
There were no other significant effects (including any for group size), Fs < 3.42, ps > .066, ηp2s < .02. Thus, conceptually replicating 
and extending Study 2, participants in the categorization conditions assumed greater differences between the groups than did par-
ticipants in the no categorization conditions (p < .001). In addition, participants expected greater differences between Twiggums and 
Zuttles when making inferences about initial, novel, and evaluative characteristics as compared to universal characteristics (ps < .001; 
all other comparisons: ps > .382). 
We used the rescored data (see Coding and Scoring) to examine whether participants dichotomized the groups more frequently 
than would be expected by chance. We ran a two-tailed t-test compared to chance (0.40). Chance is 0.40 because on any given trial 
there was a 40% possibility of choosing a 4 (0.20) or a 5 (0.20) at random (0.20 + 0.20 = 0.40).10 Participants in both conditions 
dichotomized the groups more often than would be expected by chance for initial (e.g., Zuttles like apples), novel (e.g., Zuttles like 
modies), and evaluative items (e.g., Zuttles are smart; Cat: Ms > 0.55, t[102]s > 4.26, ps < .001, ds > 0.42; NoCat: Ms > 0.48, t[102]s 
> 2.30, ps < .023, ds > 0.23; Fig. 4). Thus, the categorization task was unnecessary to create the heuristic when the two groups were 
labeled as distinct from the start and had no stated common origin. We also found that participants dichotomized Twiggums’ and 
Zuttles’ initial, novel, and evaluative traits above chance irrespective of whether they learned that there were two or many groups on 
the island (Two Groups: Ms > 0.56, t[103]s > 3.95, ps < .001, ds > 0.39; Many Groups: Ms > 0.48, t[101]s > 2.26, ps < .026, ds >
0.22). Therefore, we found no evidence that use of the dichotomizing heuristic is dependent on there being an explicit contrast be-
tween two groups. 
We did, however, discover an important and reasonable boundary condition for the dichotomizing heuristic. Participants in the 
categorization, no categorization, two groups, and many groups conditions assumed that the groups would be aligned in universal 
preferences (e.g., they both like feeling happy; Ms < 0.32, |t|s > 2.07, ps < .041, ds > 0.20). Said another way, participants were 
unwilling to view Twiggums as opposite to Zuttles when doing so required that Twiggums had highly atypical preferences (e.g., 
Twiggums like getting gum stuck in their hair).11 
4.2.2. Proximity task 
We conducted a 2 (size) × 2 (categorization) ANOVA on the proportion of trials that participants assumed that the groups lived 
segregated lives. All effects were null, Fs < 1.62, ps > .205, ηp2s < .01. Participants expected that Twiggums’ and Zuttles’ lives were 
more integrated than segregated (M = 0.36, 95% CI [0.31, 0.42], t[205] = -5.17, p < .001, d = 0.36).12 This suggests that participants 
were willing to use a dichotomizing heuristic even when they viewed the societies as more integrated than segregated. We also 
examined correlations between dichotomizing ratings (i.e., the 5-point scale) and beliefs about segregation. Controlling for size and 
categorization conditions, the greater the difference that participants expected between Twiggums and Zuttles (collapsing across 
judgment type), the more frequently they expected the two groups to live segregated lives (r[202] = 0.23, 95% CI [0.10, 0.36], p <
.001).13 
10 We had planned to conduct these t-tests at the Categorization x Size level, but because this interaction was not significant, it was more 
appropriate to examine the level of the main effects. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations by each condition.  
11 We also conducted one-sample two-tailed t-tests on the proportion of trials that participants selected a 2, 3, 4, or 5 on the scale (i.e., selected a 
characteristic that differed from Zuttles) compared to chance (0.80). For initial, novel, and evaluative characteristics, participants in the catego-
rization, in the two group, and in the many group conditions avoided selecting “1′′ on the scale (i.e., saying that Twiggums were the same as Zuttles; 
Ms > 0.85, ts > 2.18, ps < 0.032, ds > 0.22), but participants in the no-categorization condition did not avoid selecting “1” more frequently than 
would be expected by chance for initial, novel, and evaluative characteristics (Ms < 0.82, ts < 0.65, ps > 0.515, ds < 0.06). In contrast, participants 
in the both categorization conditions and in the both group conditions chose “1” more frequently than would be expected chance for universal items 
(Ms < 0.66, ts > 3.74, ps < 0.001, ds > 0.37).  
12 We had planned to run this analysis by condition, but the lack of effects in the ANOVA led us to collapse across conditions (see Table 3 for means 
and standard deviations by condition).  
13 This same relation held when we examined each of the individual judgments separately (initial: r[2 0 2] = 0.21,95% CI [0.07, 0.34], p = .003; 
novel: r[2 0 2] = 0.19, 95% CI [0.05, 0.32], p = .007; evaluative: r[2 0 2] = 0.16, 95% CI [0.03, 0.29], p = .019; universal: r[2 0 2] = 0.17, 95% CI 
[0.04, 0.30], p = .013). 
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5. General discussion 
Individuals apply a dichotomizing heuristic when forming impressions of social groups: They use what they know about one group to 
infer that the opposite is true about an uncharacterized group. Although participants exhibited this shortcut across the generic and 
specific language conditions in Study 1, learning about the characterized group as a generic whole boosted its frequency. In Studies 2 
and 3 we discovered that conceptualizing the groups as distinct entities (either by engaging in a social categorization task or by initially 
being told that they are separate groups) is a prerequisite for eliciting the shortcut among adults. Once triggered, however, adults 
applied the dichotomizing heuristic when making category-to-characteristic inferences about a novel group’s benign, novel, and 
evaluative traits. Studies 2 and 3 also demonstrated that intergroup conflict (i.e., present versus absent) or the number of groups who 
inhabit the geographical area (i.e., two versus many groups) did not measurably shape use of the heuristic. Moreover, adults even 
exhibited the cognitive shortcut when making scaled rather than binary judgments, and their beliefs did not appear to be fully driven 
by an assumption that the two groups lived segregated lives. Still, participants exhibited a rational boundary: They did not apply the 
dichotomizing heuristic when doing so would require them to say that the uncharacterized group held highly unusual preferences (e.g., 
liking to be sick; disliking to be happy). Below, we expand on these findings and propose suggestions for future research. 
5.1. Documenting a dichotomizing heuristic 
When deciding what a new social group is like, a person should ideally take time to make thoughtful evaluations, check for 
consistencies and inconsistencies in the kinds of characteristics group members express, and avoid making unfounded generalities. 
Although such practices could help foster fair, accurate impressions, they are time and resource intensive, and as a result, people often 
use shortcuts. For example, the availability heuristic—the ease with which something comes to mind is viewed as a cue to its prevalence 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)—leads adults to infer that repeatedly observed traits (e.g., laziness), even if only paired with one group 
member, describe the entire group (Rothbart et al., 1978). Children and adults also expect bidirectional individual-to-group relations: 
They extend traits from an individual to the group as well as from the group to an individual (Disendruck et al., 2015; Gelman et al., 
2010; Rhodes & Gelman, 2008; Sherman et al., 2009). 
Here, we discovered another way that individuals streamline social judgments: They use a dichotomizing heuristic. The heuristic 
operated in the absence of direct contact with, prior knowledge of, or learned “facts” about the new group in question. Instead, it only 
required first conceptualizing the uncharacterized group as separate and distinct from the characterized group. Even without making 
group differences salient (as in Moty & Rhodes, 2021), the dichotomizing heuristic emerged across several contexts. Participants 
exhibited the effect when they learned about the characterized group as a generic whole and as individual group members (Study 1), 
when there was and was not intergroup conflict (Study 2), when they learned about the characterized group in the context of just one 
other group or in the context of many other groups (Study 3), and when participants made binary (Study 1 and Study 2) as well as 
scaled judgments (Study 3). Moreover, adults not only applied it to features that they initially learned about Zuttles that were benign 
(e.g., liking apples), but they also extended it to novel preferences and skills (e.g., liking modies), and even to evaluative traits that 
signaled the morals and virtues of a group (e.g., being mean). Notably, among these manipulations, the only context where they did not 
Table 3 
Study 3 Means (SDs) of Dichotomizing Ratings, Proportion of Trials Dichotomized, and Proximity Questions.   
Two-Categorization 
(n = 53) 
Two-No-Categorization 
(n = 51) 
Many-Categorization 
(n = 50) 
Many-No-Categorization 
(n = 52) 
All Conditions  
Dichotomizing Ratings     
Initial 4.01 (0.86) 3.48 (1.06) 3.69 (0.90) 3.37 (1.04) 3.64 (0.99) 
Novel 3.89 (1.03) 3.42 (1.21) 3.52 (0.93) 3.33 (1.12) 3.54 (1.09) 
Evaluative 3.96 (0.94) 3.29 (1.11) 3.43 (0.79) 3.40 (0.96) 3.52 (0.99) 
Universal 2.95 (1.36) 2.03 (1.05) 2.58 (1.15) 2.23 (0.97) 2.45 (1.19) 
All 3.70 (0.82) 3.05 (0.92) 3.30 (0.74) 3.07 (0.80) 3.28 (0.86)  
Proportion of Trials Dichotomized     
Initial 0.66 (0.33) 0.54 (0.35) 0.56 (0.37) 0.50 (0.33) 0.56 (0.35) 
Novel 0.62 (0.40) 0.49 (0.40) 0.52 (0.39) 0.48 (0.35) 0.53 (0.39) 
Evaluative 0.64 (0.36) 0.47 (0.33) 0.46 (0.35) 0.49 (0.33) 0.52 (0.35) 
Universal 0.37 (0.39) 0.18 (0.28) 0.28 (0.34) 0.19 (0.25) 0.26 (0.33) 
All 0.57 (0.31) 0.42 (0.29) 0.45 (0.30) 0.41 (0.26) 0.47 (0.29)  
Proximity Questions     
Neighborhoods 0.38 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.37 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 
School 0.42 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 0.27 (0.45) 0.37 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47) 
Friends 0.38 (0.49) 0.34 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 
Romantic 0.45 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.40 (0.50) 0.38 (0.49) 
Healthcare 0.38 (0.49) 0.26 (0.44) 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) 
All 0.40 (0.42) 0.31 (0.35) 0.35 (0.39) 0.39 (0.37) 0.36 (0.38) 
Note. Dichotomizing ratings range from 1 to 5 (higher scores indicate that participants expect greater differences between Zuttles and Twiggums. 
Proportion of Trials Dichotomized range from 0 to 1 (higher scores are indicative of dichotomizing; on these trials, chance is 0.40). Proximity 
Questions range from 0 to 1 (higher scores are indicative of beliefs that the groups are more segregated). 
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use the heuristic was when doing so would render Twiggums as having extremely atypical human preferences (e.g., liking spiders 
crawling on them; disliking winning money). 
Several aspects of human cognition likely contribute to the dichotomizing heuristic. Social categorization is powerful: Partitioning 
individuals into groups can change people’s motivations and cognitions (Hugenberg et al., 2010; Young & Hugenberg, 2010; Qian 
et al., 2019). For example, category labels cue between-group differences in properties, characteristics, and traits (Eiser, 1971; 
Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Johnston & Jacobs, 2003; Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Lawson & Bower, 2014; Master et al., 2012; Tajfel & 
Wilkes, 1963). Children and adults also utilize speech pragmatics to infer meaning from both what the speaker says and what they 
leave out (i.e., implied contrasts; Bohn & Frank, 2019; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Grice, 1975; Halberda, 2006; Markman et al., 
2003; Papfragou & Musolino, 2003). These beliefs about group differences, combined with language pragmatics, likely work in tandem 
to facilitate the dichotomizing heuristic. In other words, people have general beliefs that distinct categories differ on at least some 
factors. Given this starting assumption, people may then search for the features that differentiate groups (Sherman et al., 2009). When 
a speaker provides information about one group (e.g., Zuttles like apples), the listener may infer that the decision to exclude infor-
mation about the second group was purposeful (i.e., this must be the key differentiating information). Said another way, the listener 
may assume that if the information was relevant to both groups then the speaker would have said as much. 
Importantly, however, data from Study 3 revealed that the dichotomizing heuristic cannot be reduced to pragmatics alone. In 
contrast to inferring that Twiggums had opposite characteristics to Zuttles when judging benign, novel, and evaluative traits, par-
ticipants predicted that Twiggums and Zuttles would share preferences considered universal to humans (e.g., they expected both 
Twiggums and Zuttles to like feeling happy and to dislike getting hurt). This evidence highlights a clear boundary condition for the 
heuristic—adults are unlikely to apply it when doing so would lead them to make highly improbable assumptions about a social group. 
Potentially, then, adults’ use of the dichotomizing heuristic may be influenced by their beliefs about how common or uncommon a 
particular characteristic is in a population. Still, many of the characteristics participants consistently dichotomized for initial and 
evaluative trait sets could also be viewed as widespread (e.g., lots of people like apples). Thus, base rates may only affect the 
dichotomizing heuristic in extreme boundary cases such as those tested in Study 3. Future studies are needed that manipulate base 
rates and test dichotomous thinking about social groups. It also would be important to try to disentangle whether the effect arises from 
Fig. 4. Study 3: Proportion of trials that participants dichotomized the Zuttles (characterized group) and Twiggums (uncharacterized group) by type 
(Initial, Novel, Evaluative, Universal) and categorization condition (Cat, NoCat). Note. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Dashed line signifies 
chance (0.40). Cat = Categorization; NoCat = No-Categorization. 
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inferences about groups in general, versus inferences based on intentionally-communicated information about groups (see Schwarz, 
1994). 
5.2. Catalysts of the dichotomizing heuristic 
Generic language is pervasive: Its ubiquity crosses the boundaries of language (Chierchia, 1998) and context, including paren-
t–child conversations (Gelman et al., 2008) and news reports (Dukes & Gaither, 2017). Previous studies have shown that hearing about 
groups in generic versus specific language encourages children and adults to assume greater homogeneity within a group (Rhodes 
et al., 2012). Here, we show that generic language also permeates concepts of uncharacterized groups (see also Moty & Rhodes, 2021). 
That is, generic language (versus specific language) inflated the assumption that two groups must have opposite preferences and 
abilities despite information only being provided about one of the groups. This type of speech may have made the descriptions of the 
characterized group appear more exclusive; generic language is deemed more appropriate when a characteristic is distinctive (i.e., 
characteristic is specific to that group; e.g., lions have manes) versus non-distinctive (i.e., characteristic is widespread across groups; e. 
g., lions are males; Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008). Although dampened, participants who learned about individual Zuttles in 
specific language condition also dichotomized the two groups. Thus, while generics appears to further cement the use of the shortcut, 
discussing group members as individuals does not eradicate unsupported inferences about unknown groups (see also Goldfarb et al., 
2017). 
Across studies, we learned that participants apply the dichotomizing heuristic if they conceptualize the groups as distinct and 
separate, and there are multiple avenues for forming this impression. When two groups derived from the same biological and social 
origin and looked identical (Studies 1 and 2), a brief experience of attempting to categorize individuals into two groups based only on 
information about the preferences and skills of one group led participants to later judge that the two groups must have opposite traits. 
Another approach is to tell participants that there are two or more social groups (no origin information), describe characteristics about 
one group, and then ask them to infer what the other group is like (Study 3). This strategy produced the dichotomizing effect even 
though we avoided language that would cue differences beyond the groups having separate labels (i.e., we didn’t use leading words 
such as “different,” “distinct,” or “separate” when discussing the groups and provided no evidence that they had distinguishing 
physical features). The least subtle pathway to elicit the heuristic is to describe groups are “different kinds” and show that they look 
different too—enabling children as young as 4.5 years of age to dichotomize groups (Moty & Rhodes, 2021). Indeed, our develop-
mental findings from Study 1 underscore the interpretation that perceiving groups as distinct is a necessary trigger of the dichoto-
mizing heuristic. Consistent with prior work indicating weaker category boundaries and less consistent characteristic-to-category 
judgments in children 5 years and younger compared to older children and adults (Goldfarb et al., 2017; Lagattuta & Kramer, 2021; 
Rhodes & Gelman, 2008; Riggs et al., 2014; Shutts, 2015; Sloutsky et al., 2015), the social categorization task may not have sufficiently 
induced 5-year-olds to treat Zuttles and Twiggums as distinct groups. Young children likely need, as in Moty and Rhodes (2021), to be 
unambiguously told and shown that members of one group differ from members of another group for them to apply this cognitive 
shortcut. 
Studies 2 and 3 further identified factors that failed to influence adults’ use of the dichotomizing heuristic. First, we did not find 
strong support that intergroup conflict (versus goodwill between groups) mattered: Adults dichotomized groups at equivalent rates 
regardless of whether Twiggums prohibited versus welcomed Zuttles to their community. Still, there may be contexts in which 
negative intergroup relations could elicit the shortcut that groups must hold opposite characteristics. For example, in the current 
research, we used novel groups to which the children and adults did not belong so that neither existing knowledge nor in-group bias 
(Killen, 2007; Rhodes et al., 2012; Roberts et al., 2017) could shape judgments. Potentially, if participants were members of one of the 
groups, intergroup animosity could boost dichotomizing rates. Second, Study 3 showed that the number of social groups featured in the 
learning context (i.e., two versus many) did not affect participants’ use of the dichotomizing heuristic. Both participants in the two- 
group condition and those in the many-group condition dichotomized the groups, suggesting that the heuristic was not simply pro-
duced by an assumption that we (as the researchers) had intentionally set up an explicit contrast between the two groups. 
5.3. Limitations and future directions 
The current studies only tested the dichotomizing heuristic using an experimental paradigm featuring novel groups. We think it is 
likely that people also apply this cognitive shortcut in real-world settings. For example, the dichotomizing heuristic could contribute to 
why some individuals erroneously assume that the Black Lives Matter movement means that other lives do not matter. Indeed, beliefs 
about the dichotomous nature of social groups could materialize in opposition towards organizations and institutions that support or 
give voice to marginalized groups. Such assumptions may be especially likely when people also hold zero-sum beliefs about social 
groups (e.g., as one group’s situation improves that must mean that another group’s has worsened; Norton & Sommers, 2011). Another 
example comes from our own experience seeing this shortcut play out: An author’s son took issue with his sister’s “Girls are strong” t- 
shirt and shouted, “Boys aren’t weak!”14 We could also imagine how this form of binary thinking might contribute to the growing 
political divide in the United States. For example, even before a Democrat learns the contents of a Republican-supported bill, they may 
14 Statements like, “Girls are strong” could also be problematic for reasons beyond the dichotomizing heuristic because if people have a stereotype 
about a group then these sorts of statements might be read as the speaker lacking confidence because people do not state the obvious (see Chestnut & 
Markman, 2018; Chestnut et al., 2021). 
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assume that if Republicans like the bill, then they (as a Democrat) will not like it. These ideas are currently speculative and will require 
rigorous experimental testing to confirm or refute them. 
Additional aspects of the dichotomizing heuristic should be explored in future research. For example, our paradigm oversimplified 
social group membership: Individuals were either Zuttles or Twiggums. In reality, people belong to multiple social groups. Although 
we did introduce the presence of multiple groups in Study 3, it also will be important to test how intersectionality influences the 
dichotomizing heuristic. Indeed, manipulating the saliency of an individual’s different social group memberships (see Chiao et al., 
2006; Gaither et al., 2014) might alter their use of the dichotomizing heuristic. We also look forward to exploring sources of individual 
differences in use of the dichotomizing heuristic as well as potential connections between dichotomizing and other outcomes. For 
example, in Study 3, we found that individuals who assumed greater differences between the two groups also expected them to live in 
more segregated communities. We imagine that dichotomizing groups may have several other negative downstream consequences. For 
example, it may be used for justifying social exclusion in an intergroup context. That is, when deciding whom to befriend 7- to 16-year- 
olds weight shared interests over ethnic group affiliation when provided with both pieces of information (Hitti & Killen, 2015; 
McGlothlin & Killen, 2005). Because people presume that preferences and abilities do not cross group lines, members of outgroups may 
be prematurely excluded: Shared preferences cannot be prioritized if they remain undiscovered. 
Finally, our contributions to understanding the developmental trajectory of the dichotomizing heuristic are limited. We found that 
children younger than 8 did not assume that groups have opposite preferences and abilities. We primarily used these developmental 
findings to bolster the argument that people must perceive of the groups as separate before they will dichotomize their characteristics 
(i.e., younger children form weaker category boundaries). We discontinued our investigation of children’s use of the heuristic in 
Studies 2 and 3 given the need to more strongly establish the triggers, scope, and boundaries of the phenomenon in adults. We direct 
interested readers to Moty and Rhodes (2021) who showed that when groups are portrayed as saliently distinct (e.g., they have 
different category labels and can be distinguished by their clothes) children as young as 4.5 years will assume between-group dif-
ferences. Still, from that work it is unclear how far children will generalize the heuristic (i.e., the characteristics they used were all 
benign—would young children also generalize to novel, evaluative, or universal traits?). Further inquiry into the development of this 
cognitive shortcut is needed. 
5.4. Conclusion 
Individuals apply a dichotomizing heuristic when learning about social groups: They assume that what is true of one group is not 
true of another. In addition to documenting this cognitive shortcut, we also elucidated the circumstances under which it arises. 
Whereas conceptualizing the two groups as distinct is a necessary trigger of the dichotomizing heuristic and generic language 
heightens its use, intergroup conflict, learning about only two groups, and binary (versus scaled) judgments are not required. Once 
activated, adults apply this rule-of-thumb broadly, even to evaluative traits, such as morals, intelligence, and work ethic; refraining 
only when dichotomizing would lead them to assign highly unusual traits to the uncharacterized group (e.g., disliking feeling happy). 
Taken together, individuals can think that they know about two social groups when they only have learned about one. 
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